Supreme Court Rule III of Pleading, Procedure and Practice—Amendments and Irregularities by Herald, E. B.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 1 
1-1-1930 
Supreme Court Rule III of Pleading, Procedure and 
Practice—Amendments and Irregularities 
E. B. Herald 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
E. B. Herald, Notes and Comments, Supreme Court Rule III of Pleading, Procedure and 
Practice—Amendments and Irregularities, 5 Wash. L. Rev. 31 (1930). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol5/iss1/5 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
driver, with whom the deceased was riding as a guest, is not
admissible as to what the deceased said or as to what was said to
him concerning taking the deceased on the trip in defendant's
truck.1 8
CONCLUSION
It will thus be seen that the decisions of our Supreme Court dur-
ing the last four and one-half years have adhered closely to the
former decisions in this state upon the subject and to what we
believe may be considered a fair, sound and correct interpretation
and application of this important statute.
ELWOOD HUTCHESON.*
SUPREmE COURT RULE III oF PLFAUn.G, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
-A!END Mm TS AND IRREGULARITIES. Can Rule I.1 governing
amendments and irregularities, be invoked by the Supreme Court
voluntarily after the trial and after judgment of dismissal for fail-
ure of proof 7 In the case of Porter v. Baretiche in which the com-
plaint was predicated upon an express contract, the action pro-
ceeded regularly to trial and resulted in judgment for the full
amount claimed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent. Defendant's
answer prayed for judgment of dismissal. In the opinion, the Su-
preme court said.
"We are also convinced from' the record before us that
appellants never intended to deal with Perry E. Joy or to
purchase any machine from him. This being true, re-
spondent cannot recover upon the contract sued upon."
Further in the opinion, the Court said.
"In view of the liberal rules of practice now in force
concernings amendments (Rule III, etc.), we will not or-
der the action dismissed, but the judgment appealed from
is reversed with directions to the trial court to hear testi-
mony as to the reasonable value of the cash register, and
such other testimony as may be offered by either party
and deemed admissible under the rules of evidence."
The defendant had not made any motion for a new trial but ap-
pealed from the final judgment upon the merits. No motion was
made by the plaintiff at any time to amend the complaint. He
stood consistently upon the contract, upon which the Supreme
Court says he cannot recover. He sought neither in the trial court
2Kopfenstetu v. Eads, 143 Wash. 104, 105, 254 Pac. 854, 256 Pac. 333
1140 Wash. XXXVI.
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nor the Supreme Court to amend his complaint to conform to the
evidence. In fact the Supreme Court says that "further testimony
must be taken before a proper judgment can be entered." This is
not a case where the court may deem amendments of pleadings
made to conform to the evidence in support of the judgment. The
Supreme Court disagrees with the judgment of the trial court.
Laws of 1929, Ch. 89, Sub-division 8, relating to judgments of
non-suit, etc., provides for non-suit "upon the motion of the defend-
ant, when, upon the trial, the plaintiff fails to prove some material
fact or facts necessary to sustain his action as alleged m his com-
plaint."
All of the sub-divisions of Rule III' appear to relate to amend-
ment of pleadings at any stage of the action "upon the motion" of
a party to the action, except sub-division 9, which provides as
follows
"At any time after trial, whether before or after judg-
ment, the trial court or appellate court may allow or make
any amendment necessary to make a pleading conform to
the proof, so far as may be just."
This sub-division permits a pleading to be amended ex post facto
to conform to the proof already in the record, but it does not seem
broad enough to justify the appellate court to send the case back
for the taking of additional proof to support a pleading not
amended or ordered amended. The appellate court expressly found
that there was not proof enough to support a judgment upon quan-
tum meruit, but it sent the case to the trial court to allow the re-
spondent to supply that proof. It would seem that such proof,
when offered, would be irrelevant and immaterial unless the com-
plaint is amended, and yet the respondent has not sought to amend
it nor has the appellate court ordered it amended. It is doubtful
that there exists any rule of court which justifies the appellate
court in sending down for retrial an action, where the court ex-
pressly finds that the appellant should prevail upon both the plead-
ings and the proofs as the record stands, and where the respond-
ent has made no motion to amend his complaint in any stage of the
action and has offered no additional proof, and where the appellant
had made no motion for a new trial but has appealed only from the
final judgment upon the merits. It would seem that the province
of the appellate court, as a court of appeal was to determine the
correctness of the judgment of the trial court or of some order or
ruling of that court, which is submitted to it for review.
It may be interesting to see how the respondent will amend the
complaint, if permitted to do so in the trial court, in view of the
finding of the appellate court that the appellants had no dealings
'140 Wash. XXXVIII.
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with the respondent's assignor, Perry E. Joy The question arises
whether the respondent would have any standing as party plaintiff
and whether the Remington Cash Register Co., Inc., the apparent
owner of the cash register according to the written contract, should
be the party plaintiff in an action for quantum meruit.
The principle involved in this decision would seem to enhance
the "uncertainties of litigation," if the prevailing party may ex-
pect the appellate court to send back the case for retrial piece-meal
upon any possible form of action, which an incomplete record may
suggest.
The Bar may be interested in the court's interpretation of the
Rules regulating procedure and practice as placing the appellate
court perhaps somewhat beyond the old-fashioned notion of a court
of review, as exercising a voluntary regulatory function in the pro-
cedure of a particular case. E. B. HERALD.
RECENT CASES
ELECTION OF REMas-ACTS CONSTrTUTING ELECTION-INEFFECTIVENESS
oF REMEDY-MISTAKE. Plaintiff was mortgagee of a valid chattel mortgage
on A's lumber. A later became financially involved and delivered the
lumber to defendant along with other assets. Plaintiff sued defendant in
the first action on contract, on the theory that defendant had promised to
pay the chattel mortgage. Judgment was entered dismissing that action
on the ground that defendant did not assume and agree to pay the mort-
gage. Now plaintiff brings this action alleging conversion and defendant
pleaded the former action as a defense. Held. for the plaintiff. The first
choice of remedy was merely a mistake and did not constitute such an
election of remedies as to prevent the maintenance of this second action.
Spokane Security Finance Co. v. Crowley Lumber Co., 150 Wash. 559, 274
Pac. 102 (1929).
Election of remedies has been defined as the adoption of one of two
or more coexisting remedies, inconsistent with each other, with the effect
of precluding a resort to the others. 20 C. J. 3; Phillips v. Rooker 134
Tenn. 457, 184 S. W 12 (1916). It is also well settled that two or more in-
consistent remedies must coexist for the doctrine of election of remedies
to apply. Consequently, where the suitor has, in the first action, mistaken
his remedy and adopted a mode of redress incompatible with the facts of
his case, he is still free to elect and proceed anew. Clark v. Heath, 101 Me.
530, 64 At. 913, 8 L. R. A. (n. s.) 144 and note (1906) Zimmerman v. Rob-
%nson, 128 Iowa 72, 102 N. W 814 (1905) 20 C. J. 21, 22-L. R. A. (n. s.)
1153, note. Washington has followed this rule of mistake of remedy in
several cases, making the statement that there is no election of remedy
when there is a good defense to the remedy chosen. Babcock, Corntsh & Co.
v. Urquhart, 53 Wash. 168, 101 Pac. 713 (1909) Roy v. Vaughn, 100 Wash.
345, 170 Pac. 1019 (1918) Harms v. Northwest Motor Co., 116 Wash. 412,
199 Pac. 992 (1922) Warren v. Sheane Auto Co., 118 Wash. 213, 203 Pac.
372 (1922) ;Godefroy v. Reilly, 146 Wash. 257, 262 Pac. 639 (1928) In re
Pulver, 146 Wash. 597, 264 Pac. 406 (1928)
The doctrine of election of remedies is often confused with that of
choice of substantive rights. The former is not a rule of substantive law,
but is merely a rule of procedure of judicial administration for the purpose
